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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
A. l\L HAFEY and BARNEY DECORA, 
d b a B A ~I INVESTMENT COM-
pANY, a Partnership, 
Pla~ntiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
PAUL IIA\'"ENS COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Thirty-Party 
Plaint~!! and Respondent 
vs. 
NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE COM-
pANY, a corpora ton, 
Third-Party Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9692 
DEFENDANT· AND RESPONDENT PAUL HAVENS 
C0~1:P ANY'S BRIEF 
ST_A_TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff against the Defend-
8Jlt and Third-Party Plaintiff Paul Havens' Company, 
for damage to a building sustained 'vhile it was being 
moved by the Defendant. The Defendant was to move 
plaintiffs' building. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant 
"·as negligent and as the approximate result thereof the 
building "Tas damaged. Defendant denies he was neg-
ligent and alleges the building collaPsed. The Defendant 
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made the New Zealand Insurance Company a Third-
Party Defendant because they had issued a Transporta-
tion Policy, and if Defendant was liable, it was covered 
by the policy up to $5,000.00. 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in 
the Court below to avoid confusion and because that is 
the way Appellant designated them in its brief. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. Plaintiff was award-
ed judgment against the Defendant, Paul Havens Com-
pany, for $8,802.93. The Defendant was awarded judg-
ment against the New Zealand Insurance Company, Third 
Party Defendant, for $5,000.00, the policy limit. 
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment against 
it in favor of Plaintiff, but if the judgment is not re-
versed, that the judgment of the Defendant and against 
the Third-Party Defendant be sustained. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
In July of 1958 Plaintiffs asked Defendant if it 
was interested in giving them a figure to move a number 
of buildings. One of the building was a masonry type of 
building and the building was so constructed that it 
could be made into t'Yo buildings by re1noving a common 
wall and by removing the outside walls and putting in 
studding and putting on new sheeting. (T. 77 and 78.) 
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Thus, n1aking it into a fra1ne building. Practically all 
that \Vould re1nain of the original building was the roof 
and the floor. Plaintiff~ asked Paul Havens in July 
of l~);)S \\"hat the value of the building was at Stansbuy, 
\Vyon1ing. He told the1n $3,500.00 for the two buildings 
('T. 2S3). The one building \Vas 75 feet long and 29 feet 
4 inche~ \vide, called the Store Building. The other was 
96 (95) feet long by 32 feet \\ride, and is referred to as 
the Comrnunity I-Iall Building. (T. 73, T. 129, T·. 284.) 
Two years later Plaintiffs contacted Defendant by 
phone to see if it would still move the building and they 
were told that the labor cost had gone up and that the 
price would have to be increased by 10% ('T. 288). 
Art Hafey asked I>aul Havens to come to Stansbury, 
which he did and Defendant and Plaintiffs again looked 
at the building. They went over the road after which 
l\Ir. Havens told Plaintiffs (T. 287): 
''I could move the building over the road if 
he could get a large bulldozer in order to move 
sorne rocks ·off of some of the shorter turns and 
off of some of the ups and downs hills there. 
They said they :knew \vhere they could get a D-8." 
'~Q. And were they going to furnish the D-8 ~ 
"A. ,, ... ell, that \vas my understanding that 
they \Y·ould pay for the D-8 and that - in order 
to pay for the extra cost of moving the extra 
distance. 
"Q. And you told them-what did you tell 
them about if you could move the building or not~ 
"A. I told them that if they could get the 
D-8 we would try to take the building over it." 
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Mr. IIavens told plaintiffs they would have to put 
in studding and put sheeting on the walls. 
The Store Building was to be moved east of Rock 
Springs and it "~as to travel over part of the same road 
that the Community Hall Building 'vas to travel. The 
Community Hall Building \ras moved by going fron1 
Standsbury, which is built on a slope, (T. 289) down the 
Stansbury Road, turn at the junction of the Stansbury 
and the Winton Road. Go down the Winton Road to the 
junction of the Winton Road and highway 187. Turn at 
the junction of the 'Vinton Road and highway 187; go 
north on highway 187 to a one-mile cut-off road. Turn 
on it and go west onto old 187 and then proceed down 
old 187 and make a turn onto the dirt road and from 
there to Rock Springs. 
T·hey cribbed around the turn at the junction of the 
Winton Road and highway 187 and around the turn from 
the cut-off road to old 187, which is a customary and 
regular way for housemovers to cross barro\Y pits or 
other depressions, and is a standard practice of house-
movers. The testimony of Ira '':ells, who has had a lot 
of exPerience with housemoving (T. 296) and the testi-
mony 'Of Jay Bleazard (T. 272), and also the testimony 
of Allison ( T. 184). He had done it (cribbing) a lot. 
The dollies had to be set out as \Yide as possible 
because of the 'vidth of the building and the building 
would ride better if the dollies \Yere \Yide ( T. 183). 
A detailed description of the housemoving equipment 
is found at T. 256 to T. 261. 
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The equipn1ent had been used to 1nove larger build-
ings than this one (T. 238, 284, offered Exhibit D-25, 
D-~G, D-27, D-28). The original rocker or bolster was 
ntade of wood reinforced with three railroad rails (T. 
~SD). A s1nall crack appeared ( T. 289). A ne\v bolster was 
brought from Salt Lake City and replaced the old. The 
house 1noving equipment consisted of a four-wheel trailer 
unit \vith a fifth-wheel located in the center. The fifth-
w·heel pennitted the front trailer unit to turn indepe·nd-
ently of the rear "rheels and to steer the vehicle. A 
bolster or rocker was secured to the fifth-wheel with a 
pin (T. 257, T. 258). Approximately 50 feet to the rear 
of the bolster and on each side of the building was located 
a set of dollies.. Each dolly consists of four wheels, 
approximately 5lf2 to 6 feet wide T. 266). A set of 
springs permitted the wheels on the dollies to move up 
and down on an uneven road, so that the building will 
stay level and not twist. ( T. 180, 181, 246, 247, 266, 27~ 
and 297). All buildings will sway when they are being 
moved, but the dollies and the bolster allow it to move 
evenly on the rocke·r ( T. 246, 24 7, 266, 267, 297). From 
the outside wheel of one dolly to the outside wheel of 
the other dolly \Yas 23 feet (T. 253). Large steel beams 
strengthened by spring timbers (T. 240, 241, 289) ex-
tend from the bolster to each of the dollies, and they 
\\·ere secured by a chain ('T. 259, 260). The building 
rides free upon the main timbers., its weight being suf-
ficient to carry it (T. 260). 
The Community Hall Building was rolled off the 
foundation and put onto the moving equipment. They 
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Put the main timbers under the building and put spring 
timbers under the main timbers by pulling the spring 
timbers down and by chaining it on each end so that 
it pulled up against the main timbers (T. 241). 
When they started to pull the house and had moved 
about one-half the distance of the building, they decided 
that the rocker wasn't strong enough (T. 237) and that 
it would put the weight on the rails (T. 289). So they 
sent to Salt Lake City for a new rocker. This had no 
detrimental effect ·on the building whatsoever (T. 237, 
T. 290). Defendant had good equipment and it had been 
used to move other houses of that length or longer and 
there was nothing wrong with the equipment (T. 238). 
The first night the building was left at Reliance 
Junction. The next night they took it to the Junction 
of Winton Road and parked it on the one-mile cut-off 
road. Nothing was done to damage the building accord-
ing to the testimony of Jay Jones and Jay Eleazer (T. 
239, 251, 271). Witness Allison did not see anything 
about the house that caused him to be concerned that 
it was going to collapse. It looked in good condition 
and was able to be moved when it was parked on the 
cut-off road (T. 185). 
The next day they went over the one-mile cut-off 
road and onto old 187 by cribbing around the turn. The 
building was kep~t level by the cribbing (T. 240, 241). 
After they got around the corner of the one-mile 
cut-off road and old 187 they got the building straight 
in line down the road. The wheels were on the road. 
They had shoulders on either side of the wheels. The 
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front "·hPPI ~Pt "·as in th<' center of the asphalt on the 
high,vay and thP t \Yo rear dollie~ \\·ere both on the road 
cr. ~-t-1, ~-t-:2). There \Va~ lnore road beyond the "yheels 
(T. :2-t-2). ThPre \Vere dual dollies, two sets for each 
\\·heel on each side. ThrPe out of the four wheels or 
tirP~ on the dollies \Yere on the paved road (T. 242). 
Road ~ 1 to :Z3 feet "·ide (T. 200) Dollies 23 feet from 
out~i<lP \rheel to outside \\·heel and the road \vas 23 feet 
\Vide \Yhere the debrie was ,and where the building col-
lapsed. ( T. 200) 
Approximately 300 or 400 feet down the road from 
the turn, \vitness Jay Jones was walking from one side 
of the road to the other and walked bac:kwards guiding 
the building. There was nothing unusual and the build-
ing looked alright at that time and there was nothng 
\vhich gave them any indication there was anything wrong 
or any unusual strain (T. 252'). Jay Jones had just been 
under the building and if he thought there was anything 
\Yrong "~ith the building, he wouldn't have been under 
it. (T. 267). The first indication that anything was 
\Vrong with the. building was when he walked from the 
"?est side of the road to the east. He sa\v the building 
start to lean in the back. He hollered to stop the truck, 
but before they could stop the building kept on leaning 
over, fell into the borro·w· pit and the \\'"heels started 
jun1ping over on the side of the road just like it was 
pulling the \\'"heels over \vith it (T. 242, 243, 261). 
T. 2G2, T 263 the Court asked questions: 
• ~Q. I have a question, sir. \\lfien the whole 
-\vhen everything had stopped and the building 
had finally collapsed, did any part of it collapse 
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on top of the dollies and your equipment, or did 
it all go to the side~ 
"A. It pulled the one set of dollies with it, 
and one timber slid with the building down into 
the borrow pit. 
"Q. Those dollies were under -
"A. Underneath the building, yes, sir. 
"Q. How did you get them out¥ 
"A. We winched them out. They came up 
through the floor of the building. 
''Q. Nothing fell on the other set of dollies T 
"A N . 
. o, s1r. 
"Q. .And nothing collapsed over your bolster 
in the front part~ 
"A. N . o, s1r. 
"Q. That all slid off~ 
"A. Just slid off. 
''Q. Did the building did that part of 
the building go onto its side before it hit the 
ground~ 
"A. It seemed to just lean over and flop 
on its side, yes, sir. The roof flew out beyond 
the building. 
"Q. The roof didn't collapse down on the 
floorY 
"A. N . o, s1r. 
Jay Bleazard \\yas behind the building. It ""as going 
straight down the road (T. 276, T. 277). He started 
gathering up the blocks where they had cribbed around 
the turn. He heard a funny noise and ran up on the 
road. He saw the back part of the top of the building 
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just kind of leaning. The next thing the building just 
raised up as though it \vas a piece of paper and sailed 
off, cr. ~~~' T. ~73), and he describes the movement of 
the dollies. \Ve quote T. 273: 
~ ~Q. Was there any 1nove1nent of the dollies~ 
H A. Yes, there was. 
''Q. And \Vhat did they do~ 
'~A. \Veil, as I remember, they were jump-
ing. That would be my right side. I was looking 
towards the back of the building. The right dollies 
\Yere jumping across the highway, just little 
jumps, inches at a time (T. 273). 
Jay Bleazard was not working for Paul Havens at 
the ti1ne of the trial, but for Ira Wells. 
\Vi tness Jay Jones testified as to the condi tj nn of 
the road and what happened. There was nothing unusual 
about the road itself when the building collapsed. There 
\\Tas nothing about the road which would indicate that 
they \Yere going to have any trouble (T. 268). Mr. Jones 
at the time of the trial was working for P. E. Valgardson 
and not Paul Havens. 
When witness Jay Bleazard was asked about the 
equipment (T. 269), the Court said: 
~~I think maybe eounsel "rill agree with you 
he doesn't clain1 the equipment was defective after 
hearing the evidence so far. Do you make any 
contention it \vas~ 
":\lr. Cra\vford: We don't waive that right, 
your Honor. 
"~Ir. Kastler: No. 
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"C. I will waive it for you. You have found 
enough on the equip·ment. There wasn't anything 
wrong with the equipment as shown by the evi-
dence·, so you don't need to go further into that." 
At the time the building collapsed, the floor was 
still partly on the dollies and blocking part of the high-
way. Jay J·ones and Paul Havens asked lv.Ir. Decora 
if he wanted to do anything towards salvaging the build-
ing or moving the floor, and he said he didn't have 
anything to do with it. He wanted $18,000.00. It was 
all up to the Insurance Company (T. 290, T. 245). 
After the insurance comp1any denied liability, the 
Plaintiff took the material and rebuilt it. 
The Court ~ade no findin..[~~}rz negligen~e· \T· 4?, 
T. 46). The Tr1al Court was 11 Je to make fmd1ng 1f 
any negligence by the motion asking the Court to 
Amend the Findings and l\Iake Additional Fndings (T. 
53) first paragraph: 
"That the defendant specifically objects that 
there has been no findings made of the facts 
which constitutes, if any, the negligence of the de-
fendant, and that there can be no recovery with-
out negligence on the part of the defendant." 
The insurance policy is Exhibit D-37. 
D-25 and D-26 are photographs 'vhich illustrate how 
the rocker and the front 'vheel set work. Exhibit D-27 
and D-28 are photographs to sho"~ that the equipment 
had been used on larger buildings, "~hich Exhibits the 
Court refused to admit. 
10 
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ARGlT~lENT 
1\~S\\rERING NI~~'r Zl·~..:\LAND IN~URANCE 
COMPANY'S BRIEF 
POINT I 
Defendant will answer third-party defendant's Ar-
gument and \Vill hereafter argue the statement of points 
raised by the cross-appeal. Answering Point I found 
on page 9 of appellant's brief. 
Rule 52-A provides: 
~'the court shall, unless the same are waived, find 
the facts speci1ally and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon." 
The appellant cited in its brief the case of West v. 
Standard Fuel Co., 81 U. 300, 17 P. 2d 292 and the case 
of Brown v. Johnson, 43 U. 1, 6, 134 P. 590. Although 
these cases were decided before the New Rules, Defend-
ant does not disagree with their holding. 
Defendant does not contend the general rule to be 
other\vise and we are assigning as error the failure of 
the courts to n1ake specific find.ings which we will set 
out in this Brief in our Arguments on our cross-appeal, 
but that Finding No. II, that the defendant Paul Havens 
Company had an insurance policy with the New Zealand 
Insurance Company, ''Thich provided for coverage for 
this accident is a sufficient finding to comply with the 
rule and that the facts of the case support this finding 
that the evidence shows that the back part of the building 
started to tip and that the pressure of the building made 
11 
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the dollies jump across the road. One of the dollies 
finally went down into the borro\v pit, with one of the 
timbers and that under the cases hereafter cited by 
defendant, the building lost its equilibrium and there 
was an overturning of the vehicle. 
POINT II 
WAS THERE AN OVERTURNING OF THE VEHICLE 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE INSURANCE POLICY. 
The only and undisputed evidence shows that the 
building started to S\vay. That the dollies jumped across 
the road and that one of the dollies and one of the 
timbers went into the borrow pit, and that the roof and 
walls of the buiding \vent into and over the borrow pit, 
the floor remaining partly on the road. These are the 
undisputed facts so there is no question about sustain-
ing the burden of proof. 
The following cases hold that there was an over-
turning of the vehicle : 
In the case of Carl Ingalls, Inv. v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 31 P. 2d 414, 416, 137 Cal. App. 741 (Cal. 1934), 
holds that \vhen a truck hit a soft shoulder in the road 
causing the truck to partially tip over spilling contents, 
but with load removed righted itself, there was "over-
turning" of truck within insurance policy covering trans-
portation of materials sinre it had been sufficiently tip-
ped over to spill contents. We quote from page 416 first 
column: 
"As was said in Granger v. New Jersey Ins. 
Co. ,108 Cal. App. 290, 291 P. 698, 700: ~A risk 
fairly within contemplation is not to be avoided 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by any nice distinction or artificial refinement 
in the use of words.' 
• • • • • 
''lt was the merchandise rather than the ve-
hicle which was insured and the safety of the 
merchandise was the object of tallting out the in-
surance.* • * • 
"The effect of an overturning on the mer-
chandise, which may thereby be dumped on the 
ground, is the same whether that ove·rturning be 
complete or only partial, so long as it is sufficient 
to cause the injury. 
''In ordinary parlance, anything has been 
overturned 'vhen it has been sufficiently tipped 
over to spill its contents." 
Moore v. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto, Canada, 
195 SE 558, 559, 186 SC 260 Texas 1950. Where wheels 
on right side of truck loaded with fruit sank down to 
the axle, a distance of two or three feet, in the earth of 
the shoulder of highway causing load to shift its weight 
and sideboards of truck were thereby broken and fruit 
"?as precipitated to the ground damage to the fruit was 
caused by "overturning" of truck within policy providing 
for payment to insure on insured liability as a contract 
or common carrier for loss or damage to goods cauBed 
by ~'overturning'' of the motor truck and/ or trailer 
since a slight overturning is as much of an ·overturning 
as a complete overturning. We quote as follows : 
In the construction of insurance contracts, it 
is vitally essential that the courts do not ignore 
the fact that the primary object of all insurance 
is to insure, and that, in cases of doubt, uncertain-
13 
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ty, manifest, ambiguity, or susceptibility of two 
equally reasonable interpretations, since the lan-
guage used is the selection and arrangen1ent of 
the insurer, such contracts must be liberally con-
strued in favor of the insured.'' 
J ac.k v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 205 P. 2d 351, 
8 A.L.R. 2d, 1-!26. When the diesel shovel was by its 
operator caused to advance up a slight incline the crane 
of the shovel swung back beyond vertical position and 
suddenly fell backwards damaging the cab of the shovel. 
T'he shovel had lost its equilibrium and it was an over-
turning of the vehicle. Insurance company contending 
unless the mechanical part itself turned over or losses 
its equilibrium no overturning, the court held against 
the insurance company's contention. This case is the 
leading case on the subject. It dscusses the Orlando v. 
~1:anhattan Fire and ~larine Ins. Co. cited by the appel-
lant and distinguished it on the facts. Also discusses the 
two cases that we have just cited and holds that the 
insurance contract should be so interpreted as to cover 
the insured. We quote as follows: 
~' It would seem that, for purposes of such an 
insurance policy as that before us, words con-
tained in the policy should be construed in view 
of the purpose of the policy; namely, to protect 
the insured's p·roperty against loss by certain 
hazards. * * * * Once a vehicle loses its equilibrium 
and the overturning process has commenced and 
proceeded beyond the po"~er of those in charge of 
the vehicle to stop its progress, it ":rould be un-
important ,,,.hether the vehicle turned over and 
over, rolling do\vn a hillside, or can1e to rest on 
a flat surface in an exactly horizontal p·ositon, or 
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eautP to re~t a short distance above the horizontal 
or at any other angle. It should be held that the 
vPhicle had overturned or upset, \\rithin the mean-
ing and intent of such a policy. 
H There is another principle applying to con-
trath; of insurance to the effect that if they are so 
dra\vn a~ to require interpretation and fairly 
~usceptible of t\vo different conclusions, the one 
\vill be adopted n1ore favorable to the insured; 
and "yill be liberally construed in favor of the 
object to be aeco1nplished and conditions and pro--
visions therein \vill be strictly construed against 
the insurer, as they are issued upon printed forms 
prepared by experts at the instance of the insurer, 
in the preparation of which the insured has no 
VOICe. 
H In the case of a contract of insurance, the 
contract is to be interpreted in the light of its 
nature, in vie\v of its purpose as such, and with a 
considerable degree of liberality in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer by reason of its 
having fra1ned the contract. A risk fairly within 
conte1nplation is not to be avoided by any nice 
distinction or artificial refinen1ent in the use of 
words. 
''Obviously, the shovel and boom lost equilib-
rium in the course of the accident which resulted 
in the damage for \vhich respondent seeks recov-
ery under the policy. The evidence shows that the 
shovel suffered an upset or overturning, resulting 
in damage to the insured machine.'' 
The case of l\lereury Ins. Co. v. \T arner, 231 SW 2d 
519 Texas 1950. Drilling mast being transported over 
rough eountry road, king pin on fifth wheel broke and 
truck and trailer beca1ne detached and drilling mast fell 
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to the ground damaging drilling mast. Court held that 
there was an overturning of the vehicle and allowed 
them to recover, and cite the Carl Ingalls, Inc. case and 
states: 
''The subject is annotated in 8. A.L.R. 2d 
1433, 1436, where it is stated that according to all 
the cases in point a comPlete overturning is not 
essential. 
"* * * * In this case, the 1nast which had been 
supported by both the truck and trailer was left 
unsupported on one end and when the truck and 
trailer became disconnected, the mast still resting 
on the trailer tipped for\\rard and fell to the 
ground with the resultant damage thereto. This 
tipping of the mast on the trailer and the result-
ant fall was a partial overturn and in our opinion 
comes within the meaning and intent of the term 
'overturn' as used in the policy.'' 
·The case of Employees Liability Assur. Corp. v. 
Groninger & King, 299 SW 2d 175, Texas 1957. A truck 
carrying caterpillar tractor made a sudden stop, broke 
the chain and the tractor being carried on the truck fell 
off onto the road and court held it to be an overturning 
of the vehicle under policy insuring against overturning 
of conveyance. 
Grimh v. Western Fire Insurance Co., 92 NW. 2d 
259, Wis. 1958. A tractor fell into a sink hole when it 
broke through the frozen ground into mud and water, 
nosed down and tipped to the right. The language of the 
policy in this case is much stronger than in the other 
cases; but nevertheless, holds that there· was an over-
turning of the vehicle and they quote fron1 the cases that 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\Ve havp her(~tofore cited in our Brief. ..:-\.lso states as 
follO\V8: 
H'rhe Jack deri8ion and others are cited in 
;>..\ .:\In. J ur. Autoinobile Insurance, see. 5-l-, page 
.)~l, in ~upport of a statPlllent that, ~ .:\ co1nplete 
overturning of the vehitlP is not neeessary to 
eo1ne "'"ithin coverage against ··up8et" or '"over-
turning.'' The real test is "\vhether or not the 
vehicle preserved its equilibrium.' " 
rrhird-Party Defendants rely upon the Orlando v. 
~Ianhattan Fire and ~Iarine Ins. Co., ±2 NYS 2d, 228. 
The ()rlando Case "\Yas discussed in the Jack v. Standard 
~Iarine Ins. Co., 205 P. 2d 351, 8 A.L.R. 2d 1426. The 
Court refused to follow the Orlando case. In the Orlando 
Case there is a dissenting opinion, which has the same 
reasoning as in the cases which ''Te have cited in our 
Brief, and cite8 the Ingalls and the ~Ioore Case, 'vhich 
we have discussed above. 
Third-Party Defendant cites Old Colony Insurance 
Co. v. Anderson, 246 F. 2d 102 (lOth Cir. 1957). This 
case does not discuss particularly the "\vording "over-
turning" but discusses the proposition that after a drill-
ing unit fell off the truck and onto the ground, then 
the drilling mast collided 'vith another truck and whether 
or not the truck itself carrying the drilling unit, had to 
be hit before there would be liability. The Court pointed 
out that there is a split of authorities on this particular 
subject and it is a proposition which is not involved in 
the instant case. 
Che1nistrand Corp. v. Maryland Gas Co., 98 So. 2d 
1 ( .A.la. 1957). In this case an iron ring broke allowing 
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goods that were riding on the tailgate and fastened to 
the truck to fall from the van, and the goods fell off the 
truck as it proceeded down the road. The facts are not 
similar to the instant case, where the entire building 
overturned and one set of dollies and one timber went 
into the borrow pit. The Court said: 
''It is immaterial where there was a partial 
or a complete overturning of the vehicle so long 
as the articles being transporated were damaged 
as a result of the vehicle losing its equilibrium 
caused by an insured risk." 
The Third-Party Defendant cites the case of Crowley 
v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 130 A. 2d 276. The 
machine fell off the truck while it was moving. It is 
similar to the Chemistrand Corp. Case where the goods 
fell off the back of the tailgate. The case is distinguish-
able on the facts. 
The Third-Party Defendant makes statements in his 
Brief and some of the witnesses make statements about 
the twisting of the building. These are not born out by 
the physical facts. ....t\.fter the house is on the housemoving 
equipment, it is physically impossible for there to be 
a twisting. It "\\~1 rock but not tvvist. Any of the testi-
mony or any state1nent to the contrary, is against the 
physical facts and is not \vorthy of belief. 
This is an insurance policy. It does not make any 
difference what caused the dollies and the timbers and 
the house to tip into the barrow pit. The fact is there was 
an overturning of the vehicle \Yithin the rule laid down 
by the cases we have cited. 
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The house, the timbers, the dollies and the front 
\\'heel set constitute the vehicle. 
llefendant contends that there is speculation and 
:5urn1ise about the overturning of the vehicle. The evi-
dence sho"·8 that the vehicle did overturn and there is 
no presu1nption to be indulged in whatsoever because 
there is direct testhnony as to exactly what happened. 
rrhe building and the houselnoving equipment all 
lost its equilibriwn so that nothing could be done to 
prevent it from falling into the borrow pit. This is insur-
ance and the reason or cause of the overturning of 
the building is immaterial. 
Defendant contends that any finding of overturning 
must necessarily be based on speculation or surmise. 
There is no sur1nise as to \Vhat happened. There were two 
\Yitnesses \Yho sa.,,· the building tip· over and we do not 
disagree \Yith the cases cited by Plaintiff holding that a 
finding of fact could not be based upon surmise, gesture, 
guess or speculation, nor do we disagree that a presump-
tion cannot stand in the face or facts because the build-
ing overturned and the dollies overturned as defined in 
the cases. rrhe dollies and the building certainly lost their 
equilibrium. 
vVhen the Defendant purchased the insurance policy, 
they \Yere purchasing Insurance against the possib~ities 
that a building would tip over when it was being trans-
ported. Becau~P if it is not so insured, then the insur-
ance con1pany \Vas taking premiums for insuring noth-
mg. 
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POINT·S URGED FOR REVERSAL ON CROSS 
APPEAL 
FIRS;T POINT ON CROSS APPEAL 
A contract carrier is not liable unless he is negli-
gent and is not an insurer of the safe delivery of the 
goods. The ·Court did not m~ke findings of any acts of 
negligence. 
SECOND POINT ON CROSS APPEAL 
T'he court erred in not admitting certain evidence. 
THIRD POINT ON CROSS APPEAL 
If Plaintiff was entitled to judgment, the Court did 
not use the correct measure of damages. 
The detailed Statement of the Points on the Cross 
Appeal are found at (T 60, 61.). 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
POINT ONE 
A CONTRACT CARRIER IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS HE 
IS NEGLIGENT AND IS NOT AN INSURER OF THE SAFE 
DELIVERY OF THE GOODS. THE COURT DID NOT MAKE 
FINDINGS OF ANY ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Defendant 'vill argue all of the assignrnents of erred 
together except the failure of the Court to allow the 
admssion of certain evidence, and that the Court did 
not use the correct measure of damage. 
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ThP state1nent of points T 60, 61 except those per-
taining to the .A.d1nission of Evidence and the proper 
rneasure of da1nages goes to the proposition that a con-
traet carrier is not liable unless he is negligent, and is 
not an insurer of the safe delivery of the goods. The only 
duty he has is to use ordinary care and the same degree 
of care that a prudent n1an would use in handling his 
O\\·n goods or another house 1nover would do in moving 
the building. ~rhe Court and opposing counsel has taken 
the vie\v that a con tract carrier is an insurer because 
there "·a8 no finding of facts made of any negligence, 
notwithstanding that it was specifically called to the 
Court's attention in Defendant's ~fotion to .Amend the 
Court's Findings and ~fake Additional Findings and 
Amend the Judgment (T 53) first paragraph. 
Rule 52 (a) provides : 
"The Court shall, unless the same are 
'vaived, find the facts specially and state sepa-
rately its conclusions of law thereon." 
This point has been argued in Appellant's Brief 
and the Court is familiar with this rule of law. 
The Rule of La"'" is that a private carrier is not an 
insurer, but is only liable for negligence. We cite and 
quote the following authorities: 
13 C.J.S. section 7± Private Carrier page 138. 
"A private carrier is not an insurer but is 
liable only for negligence. 
A private carrier is not an insurer of the 
safety of the goods intrusted to him for trans-
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portation. Where such a carrier makes a special 
contract for the carriage of goods ·or one is im-
plied, its liability is governed by the terms of the 
contract if specially made, or, if implied, by the 
nature of its i1nplication. As a general rule, a 
private carrier is under the duty of exercising at 
least ordinary care and diligence to prevent dam-
age to the goods intrusted to him for transporta-
tion, and is liable ·w·here injury results from his 
negligence or failure to use that care, but his 
liability is limited to damage or injury resulting 
from such causes." 
13 C.J .S. Sec. 13, Page 43. 
''A private carrier, as a bailee for hire, is 
within the law of bailment as to its liabilities." 
9 Am. Jur. Section 661, Page 815 
"The liability of a private carrier is in gen-
eral that of an ordinary bailee." 
6 Am. J ur. Section 242, Page 345. 
"Rule That Ordinary Bailee Is Not Insurer. 
- The rule appears ,,~en settled that unles made 
so by statute or express contract, an ordinary 
bailee, no n1atter to "~hat class he belongs, is not 
an insurer of goods delivered into his keeping, 
although, as respects a fe'\v special kinds of bailees, 
such as common carriers, and innkeepers, it seems 
that public polic~~ 1nakes them such. But unless 
he is of that class, he is liable only for loss re-
sulting from his failure to exercise, '\vith respect 
to the property bailed, the care required by 
law of such a bailee. As a general rule, therefore, 
except 'vhere a bailee has violated his contract 
he will not be liable, in the absence of negligence, 
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for loss or injury in respect to the thing bailed, 
resulting fro In the inherent nature of the property 
itself or some infi11nity thereof, disaster or acci-
dental casualty." 
The case of Beatrice Creamery Co. vs. Fisher, 10 
NE ~< l ~~0, Illinois 1937 discusses the points raised in 
the instant case and holds that: 
HAs bailee for hire, the defendants were not 
insurers of the safe delivery of the cargo given 
into their care, but were obligated to exercise 
ordinary care and diligence and be free from 
negligence in safely carrying and making de-
livery of the goods entrusted to their care under 
the contract entered into by them. Hinchliffe vs. 
Wenig Teaming Co., supra; Langendorf Cloth-
~ng Co. vs. Fara, 272 Ill. App. 160." 
'~The well-settled rule as to the liability of a 
bailee for hire was aptly stated in an opinion by 
~lr. Justice Jones, reported in the case of Beard 
0·s. Haskell Park Bldg. Corp. 248 Ill, App. 467 
at page 473, wherein this court held that 'It is 
"~en settled that a bailee for hire is not an insurer 
but owes the bailor a duty of ordinary care. As 
bailee, appellant was bound to exercise such care 
and diligence as every prudent man takes of his 
own goods of like character. Ordinary diligence 
means that degree of care, attention or exertion, 
which under the circumstances, a man of ordi-
nary prudence and discretion "\Yould use in refer-
ence to the particular thing, were it his own 
property." 
Also see JJ eyers vs. Rozan 77 KE 2d 454, 33 TIL 
App. 301. In the Utah case of Realty Purchase Co. vs. 
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Public Service Commisson, 345 P.2d 606 9Ut.2d. 375, 
it states: 
''The distinguishing characteristic of the 
farmer (common carrier) is that it transports all 
persons who request such services. contract car-
riers "the latter renders a transportation serv-
ices only to specific parties with whom it has 
contracts to do so." 
The Wyon1ing Statute 37-131 Carrier Defined. 
''Contract Motor Carrier. Any motor car-
rier other than a co1nmon motor carrier, who en-
gages in the transportation of persons or proper-
ty by motor vehicle on and over the highways 
of the state, for compensation." 
A written bid was submitted to move the building 
(T 284 and Exhibit 3). There \vas nothing said by plain-
tiffs or defendant about guaranteeing that the building 
would reach its destination. Paul Havens said he would 
try to move the building (T 287). Defendant obtained 
a permit as a contract carrier from the state of Wyo .. 
ming. Defendant's Exhibit D36. 
There had to be cribbing done \vhen the building 
was moved on and off of the highways. All of the wit-
nesses testified that cribbing is done by all housemovers 
and that it is the common and ordinary practice when 
they have to go over borrow pits or any depressions 
( T184, 272 and 296). 
Witness Jay Jones tesified that nothing was wrong 
with the house that he could observe "·hen he was work-
ing under it "rhen they \\7ere cribbing onto old 187. ('T 
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267). There \\~as nothing that he observed as being \VTong 
with the house iuunediately before the accident and it 
eollapsPd ( T ~G7). There is some testimony of the build-
ing being t'visted, but that is against the physical facts 
bP('ause 'vhen the building is on the rocker and the dol-
lie~, it R\vays or rock~ but it does not twist. This IS 
again~t the physical facts and cannot be believed. 
The Court said: 
., There \Yasn't anything wrong with the 
equipment as shown by the evidence." (T269). 
The Plaintiffs were to put up studding and sheet-
mg. 
The mere happening of an accident does not mean 
that the defendant was negligent. The preparing of this 
house for moving \vas done by the plaintiffs, and it is 
apparent that it was not properly prepared. 
COURT REFUSED TO ADMIT· EVIDENCE 
Plaintiffs offered in evidence Exhibits D25 and 
D26. These pictures clearly show the physical facts of 
ho\v the front wheel set works and how it can be on 
unlevel ground and the building will ren1ain level. In 
the record, there is a descrjption of the equipment and 
the \\'"ay it works after a house is on the rocker and 
the dollies. ( T 297, 271, 246, 247, 250, 261, 266, 267). 
It cannot tip and the testimony which says it ",.as tipped 
is against the physical facts and could not be believed 
for this reason. These Exhibits should have been ad-
Initted in evidence for illustrating purposes. Also Ex-
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hibits D27 and D28 show what orther buildings had here-
tofore been moved on the same equipment. 
The Court allowed pictures of the store building 
to be admitted in evidence to show what the building 
that collapsed looked like, but refused to allow these 
pictures to be admitted in evidence 'vhen they were of-
fered to show that the same equip1nent was used to move 
larger buildings. 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
The Court took the view that because there was 
a contract to move the building that the value of the 
building was to be determined as if it was set on the 
foundation. Ths is not the correct measure of damages. 
The value of the building would be the value of the 
building at Stansbury, Wyoming because the owner of 
the building has to assume the risk of moving it. 
Jay Jones asked ~fr. Decora if he \vanted him to 
move the floor, which was still on the dollies and the 
material and thus decrease the damages; but 11r. Decora 
took the attitude that he was going to get $18,000.00 out 
of the insurance company. This should have been taken 
into consideration in determining the amount of dam-
ages. 
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There was an overturning of the vehicle within the 
provi~ion~ of the insurance policy. If the judgment is 
sustained in favor of the Plaintiff, then the judgment 
as against the Third-I>arty Defendant should be sus-
tained. 
'I1'he Court erred in not admitting certain evidence 
and did not use the correct measure of damages. 
The defendant \vas a contract carrier. It would only 
be liable if it were negligent. There \vas no finding of 
negligence although trial court was asked to do so if 
any negligence. Therefore the trial court erred in en-
tering judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
·The judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS 
Attorney for the Defendant a;nd 
Third-Party Pla~nt~ff 
711 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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